blog

Modern Salafism: Doctrine, Politics, Jihad. Workshop 25/04/2012

Wed, 02 May 2012 12:34:51 +0100

This one-day workshop on the subject of Salafism was organised by the LIVIT project and held at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at Exeter University.

The aim of this event was to bring together postgraduate researchers and other established academics in the field working on various aspects of Salafism to present, discuss, and share their ideas. The event attracted a great interest from participants from different institutions in the UK and other countries including Germany, Belgium, and the United States, and proved to be a great success. In addition to the presenters, the workshop had the honour of the presence of some leading experts in the field of Islamic Studies from the University of Exeter as well as other scholars including Dr. Joas Wagemakers, a leading expert on Jihadi-Salafism, from the Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands.

A total of eight papers, covering different topics in this emerging field of study, were presented and discussed. Themes ranging from politics to approaches to Islamic law, the workshop provided a space for academics to critically engage with the subjects presented. It was also a great occasion for those who are not familiar with the field of Salafism to better understand a subject which has received little consideration to date. Topics related to the uncertainty concerning the relationship between politics and Salafism in particular, dominated discussion during the day generating much debate and queries.

The workshop proved that there is a growing interest in the subject of Salafism, and it provided a great opportunity for researchers to meet researchers with similar interests in the field to discuss and help each other to overcome the difficulties and challenges they face in their relative projects. Although, the duration of this event was very short, the workshop could prove to be a start for a new series of events geared towards a better understanding of this elusive field of research. There was also a possibility for the attendees to discuss matters outside of the conference on several occasions. At the dinners organised before and after the Seminar, discussions took place on several interesting topics related to Salafism.

Overall the workshop can be said to have been a success. Many different views were shared and contacts were made amongst those who attended. The various research interests and discussions which took place indicate the need for further research on Salafism, and it is the hope of all attendees that with the success of this workshop many others events will take place to bring the researchers and academics interested in this area together in order to create a network of interest on the subject.

Activism, Ideology and Sacrifice: Shi’ism in the “Arab Spring”

Tue, 06 Mar 2012 18:03:12 +0100

There is at least one Arab opposition movement which will not, it seems, be the recipient of Western military and diplomatic largesse any time soon. Bahrain remains a baffling embarrassment in Paris, London and Washington. Tunisia and Egypt happened too quickly to even flummox us; we hedged our bets as the events streamed on. For Libya and Syria, supporting the opposition was an easy call, given the history of relations, made easier by a longer period of resistance giving time for the international community to make up its mind. But Bahrain?

What explains the nervousness here? There is the long-term political investment in Bahraini stability, of course; there is a natural desire to preserve the goodwill of Bahrain’s regional partners; there is even the far-fetched fear of an Iranian neo-Safavid bid to reoccupy the islands, fed by the current Iranophobia. But supplementing all these factors is, I suspect, an anxiety of a movement made up of Shi’a. Since Amal and Khomeini in the 70s, Shi’i activism has caused much concern in Western security circles. Hizbullah and then more recently, the Mahdi Army (amongst others) have intensified this unease. The desire to isolate a single explanatory cause for all these troubles has led some commenters to cite Shi’ism, and to have a knee-jerk distrust of Shi’i political actors. It is the modern-day equivalent of the terror which greeted the campaigns of the Qaramita and the Hashishin.

The intellectual background which probably encourages this wariness of Shi’ism is a history replete with messianic rhetoric, sacrificial motifs and suspect esotericism. We can take these in turn. Messianism can go either way: it can encourage activism (with the potential for violent resistance); or it can engender quietism (as one awaits the messiah). Shi’ism has seen its fair share of both, with positions in between. What has been more difficult, at least in Twelver Shi’ism, is to develop a doctrine of positive engagement with political power whilst waiting for the Mahdi’s Return. Only in the last two centuries of Shi’i thought do we see the germination of such a doctrine. It is a quite modern phenomenon.

On sacrifice, the shocking (and for some terrifying) martyrdom narratives of the early Shi’i movements are seen as the cause of recurrent instability. That major Shi’i figures accepted an often bloody and violent death, and that their stories are recycled within Shi’i activism, has troubled both commentators and policy wonks like. But this too can go either way. For much of its history, the Twelver Shi’a have commemorated the tragedy of Karbala, when Imam Husayn went willingly to his death in the face of tyranny. But, on the whole, the Twelver political philosophy (such as it was) has been quietist; very few have emulated Imam Husayn with the literalism of some modern Shi’i activists. Other religious traditions have extreme sacrifice at their core, but the crucifixion is not often cited as a cause of (say) the Mexican war. When shahadat (martyrdom) features in a simple cause and effect argument, I smell polemic rather than commentary.

Finally, there is Shi’i esotericism. A hidden doctrine which only the initiated can understand was a possible option in early Shi’i thought. It gave way pretty quickly to a more open declaration of Shi’i belief, even within a context of Sunni dominance. Linked to this in the popular imagination was the doctrine of taqiyya, sometimes glossed as “pious dissimulation”. Taqiyya is characterised as permitting Shi’i believers to conceal their true faith in the face of personal or community threats. What is rarely noted is that Sunni jurists, in the main, do not disagree: dissimulation is permitted under extreme circumstances. They even use the term taqiyya to describe such a dispensation. Finally, internal distrust of the Shi’a has, perhaps, led Western academic commentary to view Shi’i accounts of early Muslim history as particularly unreliable. They are contrasted with the more “balanced” or “objective” versions of the Sunni writers. Fortunately, Islamic studies has (generally) left such crude caricatures behind, but a popular suspicion of hidden Shi’i motives nonetheless remains a recurrent motif.

Shi’i activism in Bahrain does not, on the whole, appear particularly messianic (unless I have missed something); neither does it promote suicidal martyrdom (though the sacrifice has been real); it does not have a hidden agenda (however its opponents might portray it). The movement, for now at least, seems accidentally Shi’i – it is not about ideology and orthodoxy, but rights and participation. Like much of the rest of the “Arab Spring”, the values of 1789, not 1979, inspire it. In the end, a knowledge of Shi’i doctrine may not help us understand the Bahraini movement; but the perception of Shi’ism (dangerous, suicidal, secretive) informs the efforts of those wishing to preserve the Bahraini status quo - or even change it for the worse.

Report: LIVIT Conference, 5-6 September 2011

Thu, 20 Oct 2011 09:56:37 +0100

We felt saturated by scholarship following the second LIVIT conference – so sated were we that only now have we got around to putting our reflections together. It was, we hope all present would agree, a very stimulating twodays. Istvan and myself felt the quality of contribution – and the engagement of participants meant that the coverage of violence and its legitimization in early Islamic thought was impressive. We included not only “strictly” religious writings looking at violence in abstract – but also many detailed studies of historical episodes, and their incorporation into the narrative of early Islam. Poetry, art and prose literature also came under scrutiny, alongside political theory and jurisprudence. This breadth of coverage was due to the engagement of those who came – and whom (we hope) will contribute to the published volume of proceedings.

We were sad, though, to not have had the pleasure of the company of two speakers, who were scheduled to attend and present papers. Professors Hamori and de Blois had to cancel at short notice for health reasons. Despite his absence, Professor Hamori’s paper on Jihadi poetry was delivered and contributed to the conference through its linkage of modern themes with classical styles. Indeed, the whole conference was focussed on the early period, but what was clear was that the structures of thought which legitimatize or delegitimize violence in Islamic thought had longevity, and were replicated in different epochs and at different times (including, it should be said, the modern period). The stark division between the “modern” and the “pre-modern”, both in interpretive method and in modes of discourse, was undermined – from my perspective, and from the perspective of the LIVIT project as a whole, it became clear that understanding the discussions around violence in modern Islam requires a full understanding of its antecedents – and that can only happen through detailed studies such as those presented at the conference.

We thank all those who took the trouble to come to Exeter – and we look forward to our next LIVIT conference in September 2012 (definitive dates will follow in due course) – where the focus will be later medieval and early pre-modern discourses on violence and its legitimacy. We hope that the 2011 conference was a fitting tribute to the scholarship of Professor Dr Thomas Sizgorich, who was due to attend, but sadly passed away unexpectedly in January 2011, nd to whom the confernece was dedicated.

What comes first: a caliph or the jihad?

Tue, 24 May 2011 21:51:35 +0100

What comes first: a caliph or the jihad?

In its statement, Al-Qaeda called the death of Bin Laden an historic event. The statement was full of praise for what they called his bravery, but also full of cheer, for Bin Laden’s “martyrdom in the cause of God”, a martyrdom he had been seeking for about 30 years. This comes as no surprise: for proponents of Jihadi-Salafism, being killed by “the enemies of God” is the greatest personal achievement. They refer to the Quranic verse “Say: Can you expect for us (any fate) other than one of two glorious things (martyrdom or victory)?” (Q9.52)

Bin Laden’s demise will be, no doubt, demoralizing for some international Salafi-Jihadis. He is seen as a symbolic figure who sacrificed his wealthy life in the cause of God. His role in the Afghan war, founding al-Qaeda and uniting different Jihadi groups including North Africa, Arabian Peninsula, and Somalia under one banner have earned him this charismatic aura, resulting in numerous statements of praise.

However, the impact of his death should not be overstated. Al-Qaeda and other Salafi-Jihadi groups may share the similar goals and ideas, but they are far from being a single organization. Most operative Jihadis today have never even met Bin Laden. At the core of Salafi teaching is an emphasis on absolute monotheism (tawhid) as the basis of salvation, and a rejection of saint worship. Constructing shrines and praying near tombs are strictly forbidden; thanks to Bin Laden’s sea burial, Al-Qaeda will not have to worry about his tomb becoming a shrine and the theological paradox it would entail.

Salafi-Jihadis, such as Abu Qatada, make much of being at-Ta’ifah al-Mansura (“the victorious group”), fighting in the path of God. According to a prophetic hadith, this group will always exist and will never be harmed by opponents or traitors. The Ta’ifa Mansura can exist in one place or in different places. In his Knights under the Banner of the Prophet, Ayman al-Zawahiri states that although many jihad leaders were killed or executed in Nasser’s Egypt, the “knights” were not thereby weakened: they were assured by God that new leaders would always be found to carry out the “duty”.

One expects Al-Qaeda to name a new amir to replace Bin Laden - in accordance with Salafi-Jihadi doctrine, there is no jihad without one. That raises the question: what is an amir according to the doctrine of the Salafis?

In mainstream Muslim jurisprudence, the community is obliged to give the oath of allegiance to the imam to strengthen the Muslim polity. The imam, the head of the Islamic state, is the one responsible for declaring both the jihad and the peace. Individuals should not wage jihad, as they might contravene the rules of war. The imam can appoint an amir to lead the jihad on his behalf. It is the post of amir that Bin Laden held, and which is now vacant.

Jihadis insist that since in our time there is no imam; and so it is the “people” who are obliged to appoint an amir to lead the jihad. The amir in this case is not the imam, and his responsibilities are restricted to the execution of the jihad. This is similar to the appointment of a leader for prayer or pilgrimage when there is no imam. So, the right to appoint an amir for the jihad devolves to the people: that is, the mujahidin. By doing this, the Salafi-Jihadi ideologues establish the necessity of an amir for the jihad, even without an imam; and this amir need not even be in operational control. Even if he is imprisoned or killed, the jihad duty remains. His existence as an amir alone makes the jihad possible, and his death or imprisonment require a replacement, but it does not cancel the obligation.

Of course, for some Salafis the whole notion of the mujahidin choosing the amir is flawed, The influential Salafi, Muhammad Nasir al-Din Al-Albani, for example, argued that jihad cannot be performed at all, as there is no imam to authorise it and no one to appoint an amir. Whilst this reasoning is rejected by the Jihadi-salafis, they are nonetheless heavily influenced by mainstream jurisprudence.

The duties, responsibilities and character of the amir are not fully worked out in literature, but the Jihadi-Salafi writers, such as Dr. Fadhl in his Al-'Umda fi I'dad Al-'Udda (The Essentials of Preparing for Jihad), are generally bound to the conception found in mainstream Sunni jurisprudence (in which the amir is chosen by the imam). There is little original consideration as to what the mujahidin should look for in an amir given the imam’s absence. The Jihadi notion of the new “leader of war” (amir al-harb) is, in the end not so different from that described in mainstream Sunni law. They list the requirements of the leader: he should be male (obviously); of sound body (and without any disability of the senses). Being a religious expert is not a necessity, but knowing the laws of warfare is. The leader must also be sound, adult, free man, and just. A corrupt strong leader is always preferred to a pious but weak leader. The amir can only be disobeyed if his demands explicitly contravene the Shari’a (however that is conceived). So, no military action, even a minor skirmish, can be carried out without his consent. All of these elements are found in established tradition, in which the imam appoints the amir.

The decision within the Al-Qaeda leadership now turns not on the reiteration of this list, but on whether Bin Laden has designated a successor. There are two possibilities. He may have already appointed someone (or perhaps, more than one individual, in which case a council (shura), also appointed by him, will have to decide). Alternatively, he may not have appointed anyone; in which case the shura will have to decide without a shortlist. Unanimous consensus is not essential, but it is desired. It is unlikely we will know much of the shura’s existence, never mind its deliberations. But in all this, we should remember: the debate between Jihadis and their Salafi opponents (such the debate between Albani and a Jihadi) does not relate to the amir himself (be it Bin Laden or anyone else): rather it concerns what comes first: a Caliph or the Jihad?

Sorcery, Punishment and Orthodoxy

Mon, 16 May 2011 04:19:32 +0100

Buried under the reports of Osama Bin Laden’s death (a subject for another occasion), the arrests in Iran of some prominent political figures associated with the President may seem rather minor news. Those named have been accused of sorcery and unleashing metaphysical forces. It may, or may not, be a real story; it probably tells us more about internal Iranian power politics than any surge in superstitious practices. What it does reveal, however, is the potency of the accusation within a Shi’i Muslim context. Shi’i jurists in both the past and present have generally agreed that the practice, teaching and study of magic are forbidden. Anyone practising magic, or declaring it permitted, is to be put to death. Reports from Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq (p.366 in this link) stipulate beheading as the appropriate means of execution.

The sorcerer’s offence is equated with apostasy. He or she has disobeyed a direct stipulation of God and attempted to release supernatural powers. The sorcerer and sorceress cease to be believers since they claim to have harnessed a power reserved for God. The execution of the sorcerer is, concomitantly, a punishment prescribed by God – it is one of the hudud. And as with all the hudud, some jurists clearly wish to avoid their implementation. They introduce caveats: the accused has to be asked to “describe” his magic – perhaps he does not know what magic really is; he has to be given the chance to repent so we can forgo the death penalty. In this, Shi’i jurists (like their Sunni counterparts) refuse to rush into the hudud; there is ample scope for avoidance. I do to expect to see such reticence tocome to a judgement in the Iranian cases; though the hadd is unlikely to be enforced.

Magic itself is considered mere trickery by most Shi’i jurists. A man may claim to have killed another through magic – and he will be put to death for such a claim. But the relatives of the victim will have no power of redress. Magic is theologically rather than supernaturally dangerous (“it has not basis in reality” - la haqiqa lahu is the phrase often used). At least this is what most Shi’i jurists have held; and in this they agree with some Sunnis (the Hanafis), and disagree with others (the Shafi’is). In the reporting of the Iranian cases, however, the accused appear to be charged with actually operating metaphysical powers. Unusual in this area of jurisprudence is the contemporary Iraqi marj’a, Ayatallah Muhammad Ishaq Fayyad. He is alone, as far as far I can ascertain, in arguing that the execution verdict probably only applies to a professional sorcerer – if you dabble in magic once or twice, you may not be subject to the death penalty. Repeated and continuous sorcery is problematic; being a dilettante magician is forgivable for Fayyad. For other scholars, a single proven instance of practising magic appears sufficient to justify the punishment: for them, sorcery is like adultery – do it once and you are a sorcerer. Ayatallah Fayyad does envisage circumstances in which the sorcerer will be liable for retaliation (qisas) from the victim’s relatives (as do other scholars, including Ayatallah Khu’i): if a man casts a spell on another, making him think, for example, that a lion attacking him, and the victim dies of fright, then the sorcerer is responsible for the death and is subject to qisas (before, of course, being subject to hudud). Even here, though, magic is not really effective – it merely provides the cover for the murderer’s rather elaborate MO. Otherwise there is no qisas for death by incantation in Shi’i fiqh.

The opponents of the Iranian regime will see in these arrests another instance of the irrationality in Iranian power politics. But it is not, in truth, irrationality: the reported arrests of high profile “sorcerers” in Iran point to the concoction of religious orthodoxy and the exclusive clerical vision of right government which characterises one of the numerous visions of the Islamic Republic. The accusation, then, are an amalgam, of heresy and treason.

Caught by the Magic of Control: Who is afraid of democracy in the Middle East?

Fri, 25 Mar 2011 09:27:32 +0100

Not much attention was paid in the international media to the demands of the Iraqi protesters circulated on many Iraqi websites and Facebook pages inviting people to join demonstrations on February 25^th in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square. The lack of any media interest can be partly attributed to the fact that what they oppose is a scheme forced upon them in the name of democracy.

Arab regimes for centuries have denied freedom and economically abused their “subjects” and the available natural resources. Democracy and revolution are Western secular and modern concepts; however, for the Arab protesters in the streets, claims of freedom and democracy are neither Western nor Islamic. They are rooted in their social and political conditions.

Nevertheless, imposed concepts combined with a level of economic exploitation that reaches the point of colonization can result only in desperation and disillusionment - even if it is called “democracy”. That is why the Libyan opposition - even while struggling for mere survival - felt initially resistant and was obliged to declare its rejection of any foreign military involvement.

The catalogue of Iraqi discontent opens with rhetorical questions - “Don’t you know that we carry on our backs about (100) billion U.S. dollars annually from oil imports, trade and tourism and we still eat only onion, when it is available?” - and followed by a number of cries, some of which are listed below:

· Death to a democracy that turns things from bad to worse!

· Death to democracy that turn people into strangers and aliens in their own homeland!

· Death to a democracy that turns a blind eye to the government that steals billions!

· Death to a democracy that promises transparency for eight years in a muddled, filthy atmosphere!

· Death to a democracy that appears to worship the throne (ie. political authority)!

· Death to a democracy that arrests the killers then discharges them and announces their escape!

· Death to a democracy of ignorance, poverty, underdevelopment and murder!

· Death to a democracy that eliminates the pen of opposition and the word that expresses the truth!

· Death to a democracy of allotments and sectarianism!

· Death to a democracy of walls that have divided Baghdad!

From this proclamation one knows what “democracy” means in today’s Iraq: vacant discourse, poverty, corruption, nepotism, sectarianism, assassinations, murder, separation walls and dictatorship. We can also get to know what is missing: the establishment of a genuine democratic system and the foundations political and civil freedom, citizenship and human rights – all that make up the essence of the western liberal democracy. Iraqis want change, like Tunisians, Egyptians, Libyans and Yemenis (to mention only a few).

The efforts of experts and journalists to look for parallels in the hope of better predicting the future is misleading, for any evaluation based on the Western tradition and history is obviously inadequate. What is going on now is the revolution of the Arab peoples and not simply a delayed repetition of “our” revolutions.

Any system based on equality and justice in Muslim countries cannot be separated from the related Islamic principles and very probably it will embrace some form and degree of Islamism in these states. Recent events are not inspired by traditional Muslim ideas on rule, justice and change, and the primary impetus of the protests is desperation and deprivation. Nevertheless, in the atmosphere of oppression and economic exploitation, Islam has become a synonym for solidarity, justice and social care. Islamists and Islamic parties - legitimized or banned - emerged as the leading opposition forces. Their character is far from homogeneous and even in one single movement anti-Western, radical revolutionary factions and compromise-seekers can be found as can be seen in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood.

When evaluating the possible outcomes of the current developments in the Arab world, dangers of an Islamic revival are often (over)emphasised. However, it serves only as a mere pretext that aims to hide that the real menace has always been independence. “The US and its allies have regularly supported radical Islamists, sometimes to prevent the threat of secular nationalism” – as Noam Chomsky has stated. Nothing can guarantee the dodging of an independent secular nationalism better than the promotion of sectarianism - as has happened in Iraq.

The overwhelming desire of Western policymakers to keep the region under control eliminates any chance for real cooperation. The favoured approach of “backing moderate trends” however, is possible only by respecting the Arab, Muslim public. This implies – among others - accepting the results of genuinely free elections, irrespectively of their results. Waging wars and operating within an institutionalized paranoia serves to secure Western economic and strategic interests and is much less profitable than taking the risk of setting “the rules of the game” together.

What shall we do without our West friendly dictators? Part four. ...

Wed, 16 Mar 2011 10:00:25 +0100

Freedom is responsibility. In reality even Western citizens are happy to give up most of their political responsibility if in turn they live in comfort. Personal liberty is essential for Westerners but political liberty is important for us mostly as a guarantee that we can rid ourselves of those who we think harmful to our personal liberty or responsible for our countries’ economic problems. The role of the state is to ensure the collaboration or at least the coexistence of its citizens. The state has the right to limit the personal liberty of a citizen in order not to allow him or her to harm the liberty of others. <?

People living in different cultures, however, have different standards regarding how much personal liberty they require for themselves and how much liberty they want to allow to others. In Western liberal democracy a relatively high level of both liberty and tolerance are required, but there are other cultures that are ready to renounce some liberties in order to maintain the norms. This could be perfectly democratic, but less liberal. Nevertheless we should not forget that in most societies in the history of humankind were absolutely satisfied with living under the rule of a just monarch. (What we consider just is of course relative and shows what the actually accepted social norms are.) If we look sincerely at our democratically elected leaders, they are not much better than former dynasts and usurpers. We usually consider democracy as the greatest achievement in the West, but the rule of law can be seen as even more important. What people in the Arab countries really want (Muslims and Christians alike) is not the fatigue to rule each-other and the risks to be ruled by each-other, but to live in predictable and acceptable conditions in a just society with clear norms. The Arabs want to get rid of parasite tyrants and oligarchies, they are attracted by Western comfort and personal liberty, but they do not want Western liberal democracy with openly loose social norms.

In spite of the astonishing impetuosity of the recent revolutions, what the people of the Arab countries desire and what they will get does not evidently coincide. The revolutions were successful because the armies did not crush them. In Cairo, the largest metropolis of the Arab world, the apparent neutrality of the army resulted in absurd scenes like the “Tahrir Square battle of the camels” while soldiers were sitting in their tanks as mere spectators.

Since the beginning of organised agriculture, the Egyptian society was always pyramidal and dominated by the bureaucracy and the army. Rulers often came from the military, like Nasser, Sadat or Mubarak in the modern times.

From 525 BC up to 1954 AD the armies that controlled Egypt were composed of foreign troops. It is possible that a national army was less willing to massacre their countryman, but more importantly, they did not intervene because the commanders knew they remained in control. Thus there was no need for violent engagement, which would have made them unpopular in the eyes of the people and possibly even in the eyes of some of the troops. The army has the guns (real guns) and their privileges are so strong that their unity is unlikely to be dissolved by revolutionary propaganda.

As long as the Egyptian army is the main power in Egypt, the uninvited God-fathers of the Egyptian people (the use of the paradox image is deliberate), Western governments (including Israel) do not have to worry at all. Egypt is under control. If the Egyptian army was not loyal to its commander, the president of the country (the role of Mubarak in deciding not to use them against the people is still an open question), it remained faithful to its real boss, the government of the United States of America. This is perfectly logical. They need the American money and they could not confront the American army. Since the Americans support Israel even against their own interest, it is against the interest of the Egyptian army to allow any political force to rise to power that would put them in real conflict with Israel.

In addition to this Egypt is one of the most militarily vulnerable countries in the world, when facing an enemy with nuclear weapons. The balance of force between the Israeli and the Egyptian army is absolutely asymmetrical. But chaos in Egypt would only lead to another asymmetrical warfare (commonly called “terrorism”) against Israel and against a much easier target, the Egyptian Christians. There will be no chaos in Egypt. It would serve only the interests of a few extremists who gain power from conflict. What we can expect is some kind of democratisation channelled by the army and indirectly by Western governments.

In most Arab countries any foreign military intervention would lead to disastrous consequences. Intelligence services are pretty busy finding out how to ensure some control over the uncontrollable regions of Yemen, and to put things back on the right track in Libya. If the conflicts between institutionalised and state sponsored Wahhabi Islamism, Jihadi extremists and the discriminated Shiites of the Arabian Peninsula intensify, it could have global consequences. Similarly, serious unrest in patchwork countries such as Morocco and Algeria, with their large territory, huge geographical ethnical and social diversity, could lead to a terrible turmoil of violence.

So the mission is far from completed: It is a shared duty of Western and Non Western thinkers and peoples to collaborate in ameliorating our future, building up on what is common in our cultural heritage and learning from each-other when it comes to the differences. Realistically, however, we can only hope that the self-sacrificing courage of the revolutionaries all over the Arab world will push Arab and Western leaders to cook up alternative ways for the political, economical and cultural collaboration of the peoples they represent.

What shall we do without our West friendly dictators? Part three. By the light of human torches

Fri, 04 Feb 2011 12:12:33 +0100

Suicide bombers blowing up themselves and others as well as suicide protesters burning themselves demonstrate extreme despair. In the case of the latter any religious motivation should be excluded and religion merely serves to sanctify the existing rage.

These extreme actions are symptoms of a global crisis that is intellectual, spiritual and ideological, but also social, economic, demographic and ecologic. This complex question will be resumed in a later note, but some aspects have to be mentioned here.

In North Africa the hunger protests have been going on since October. At that time the Western media did not pay much attention to the problems of rural North Africans. Hunger is caused by high food prices, and over the last decade, commodity prices and the U.S. stock market have usually moved together. The population of the Arab countries has been multiplying in the last decades and became proportionally younger and younger. The economy and even the ecology of these countries cannot support this demographic growth and the social and political structure is under extreme tension. In the entire World the spread between generations become deeper and deeper due to the fact that with the constantly accelerating technical evolution the knowledge and experience of the elders is considered outdated and useless by the young. This problem is exacerbated by the fact the young are often hopeless, unable to find a way to success. In addition, it might be said, that since the young are using more the limbic part of their brain they are more passionate and less wise than the elderly using more their cerebral cortex. It is not by chance that the Masais excluded the unmarried young warriors from the villages, ancient Greeks sent them to found colonies and the Romans put them in the front line of their legions. Suicide bombers in their 60s-70s are rare. Selfish senile despots leading families and countries are many, and their answer to the current problems is repression.

Emigration is of course is a solution for many. But it has always been a difficult one. In addition, as the Arab countries are (currently) technologically and militarily underdogs, this emigration cannot be a glorious conquest, but an individual immigration, in mass. Mass immigration, however hinders integration and since social structures are primarily mental, they are carried by those who flee to their new countries; the original problems are reproduced. Delusion, hopelessness and identity crisis in their old or new homelands turn many Muslims toward radical streams.

Of course Islamism is also fuelled by the Wahhabist ideology of oil-rich Gulf countries and to the fact that during the cold war the card of religion was played against the communist threat. Religion – especially in these antagonistic environments can also provide an important manifestation for the opposition. It is not unknown in Eastern Europe as well, where the Polish Solidarity movement was highly religious in both its character and ideology. Communism in its Eastern European sense is over but Islamism remained there.

The Eastern European experience shows that “joining the West” is a very difficult process and Western help is rarely genuinely generous. The backbone of democracy is the middle class. This middle class is fading even in the West and its values are eaten of by the society of consummation. The Tunisian middle class is relatively strong, but who can lead them? As the Eastern European experience shows, a real renewal should bring a decisive end to the former regime, so its collaborators should be excluded from the new leadership. Another experience is that returning emigrants are rarely welcomed as leaders; they are rather seen as irritant outsiders (Maghrebis living abroad and returning back “home” for holidays are called with envy and despise “facance” by the others). How to build up a society of conscientious citizens from masses socialised to live in oppressive structures, helped by a West offering unequal business and MTV? I want the Tunisians and Egyptians to find their way. But it’s ganna be hard.

What shall we do without our West friendly dictators? Part two. Violent Muslims and Western idiots

Wed, 02 Feb 2011 16:47:54 +0100

The Eastern European experience also illustrates how the question of “where to go?” is transformed into the question of “how to join them?”. A process in which many essential problems are swept away unresolved in the urgency of action. Namely, societies once belonged to the “Eastern Bloc” very soon had to face the problems of Western democracy.

Western democracy is one of the best social systems ever to exist regarding the welfare of its own community. But it is remarkably difficult to apply to societies where it is not the product of a centuries-long internal evolution. The western media often offers the simplistic idea that our model is ideal and the problem is the manner of its adoption by the non-Westerners, or if more empathy is present, its adaptation for them. The democratic ideal consists of a society of free and responsible citizens making public decisions together. In our so called “western liberal democratic” states these principles are not at all fully realised. Citizens do not have either the possibility or the will and the qualifications to actively participate in daily politics. The purpose of our education is more and more to produce suitable labour for national and multinational companies and less and less to educate cultivated, happy and thoughtful individuals. Our democracy educates us to be idiots in its original Greek sense, meaning by διώτης (idiotés) someone who did not participate in political or public life.

But as far as things going well or seeming to do so, it does not appear to be a problem. We choose deputies to make decisions instead of us. The problem is that we choose those who we are guided to be chosen by the media and the media itself is guided by those who pay them. As a consequence, politicians do not represent the interest of the “electors”, but the interest of those who make the electors elect them.

Contradictions, however, become apparent in the emerging conflict situations. The Iraq venture demonstrated many of the weaknesses of Western democracies. Our countries were led into a war serving the interests of some business companies and their political representatives who, with the help of the media, cheated their electors and, in the case of the United Kingdom, violated their will. The ideals of democracy were of course even more violated in Iraq, where they were used to exploit the country and led to its destruction.

Unfortunately, outside of the West, the image of democracy - which would be positive due to the wealth and the liberties of the West - gets constantly spoiled by the fact that our democratic countries support non-democratic regimes serving interests of Western companies rather than the interest of their own nations. Most of the enormous amount of U.S. funding given to the Egyptian government is directed to its armed forces. I saw Egyptian policemen sitting in cars mounted on bricks instead of wheels and others with corked rifles. The army and its American weapons are more serious but the Egyptian armed forces could not really harm their ally, Israel, especially if one considers what would happen to the country if their dammed dam (an ecological catastrophe already) gets bombed; their true mission is to repress their own people. In Egypt a revolution against the established corrupt regime might give rise to an equally oppressing Islamist rule. Mubarak’s regime has been blackmailing its foreign supporters stating that his only alternative is the rule of the Islamist, but the rise of radicalism is due mainly to his rule.

Western policy makers are also responsible for the present situation. Their main aim was not to help the Arab (and other) countries by doing fair business with free people of independent states, but controlling them relatively cheaply through their corrupt despots and taking advantage of the situation. The rise of Islamism in the population of countries where we are exporting our democracy as well as in the immigrant Muslim communities in our countries shows that they are far from being satisfied with what we “offer” to them. Their reaction is not exclusively the result of differences of religions, cultures and traditions. Their aggression comes from frustration. Their violent thoughts and deeds are symptoms of their crisis and our own.

What shall we do without our West friendly dictators? Part one. Après eux, le déluge.

Tue, 01 Feb 2011 09:24:23 +0100

One of the main goals of the LIVIT project is to examine the much "mediatised" topic of violence in Islamic thought on a scholarly level and to share the outcome of our research. This does not apply to the following note that presents some personal opinions rather than the results of a scholarly study. The provocative style of some of the statements is deliberate. A neutral note is sometimes difficult to recall. Due to the ongoing events, I gave up looking for Internet links in order to put this note on the website as quickly as possible.

Two weeks ago I met a senior academic of Tunisian origin. He was in a state of revolutionary euphoria. This state of mind presupposes the experience of living under oppression and having the chance to get liberated from it. I had the same experience in 1989 when communist rule was crashed in Hungary and subsequently in all Eastern Europe. There are also examples from Egypt. What comes after this euphoria? This question worries everyone concerned with the future of Tunisia, Egypt and the whole Islamic World.

In order to predict the outcome of these revolutions we should know with certainty who triggered them and who is or who will be controlling them. The Romanian revolution in 1989, that cost the lives of hundreds of citizens, started as protest in defence of the Transylvanian Hungarian Calvinist priest L. Tőkés and was a cathartic event subsequently “hijacked” by the “old guard”. The destiny of the current revolutions in countries with Muslim majority depends greatly on those who maintain the oppressive regimes, i. e. the Western powers and the local armed forces. It is clear that the international media and the modern means of communications (such as mobiles phones and Internet) offered new weapons to the revolutionaries who had grown used to being disadvantaged in the face of governments which had previously held exclusive control of both the media and the organised armed forces.

The recurring question is how can the destructive flames of despair turn into the sound reconstruction of entire societies, providing health, wealth, stability and welfare to its citizens? If the goals of the liberated (and the liberators) are too diverting, chaos and civil war follow, as after the “liberation” of Iraq.

In the case of Eastern Europe the goal seemed to be very clear: to join the West. In Tunisia the call of Islamist radicals seems to be much less strong than the appeal of Western consumer society, so we can expect a similar aspiration. However considering the forced westernization of social customs and traditions by the oppressive regime of Ben Ali, the outcome can still provide us with surprises. Egypt is a huge sick elephant, and the West, as well as the oligarchies of the region, are concerned about what will come out if its old skin tears.