We were fortunate to have (yet another) array of outstanding international scholars visiting Exeter for the third and final LIVIT conference, held on Monday 2nd and Tuesday 3rd September just passed.  The papers were rich in general observations and detailed analysis.  Perhaps the primary debating points came to the fore towards the end of the conference: in the pre-modern period, what counts as Islamic thought? What counts as violence? What counts as legitimacy?  A propos the first question, the judgement of the "religious" sciences (fiqh, tafsir, kalam etc) is often considered the ultimate criterion whether one can describe a norm as "Islamic" or not. Perhaps, "Islamicate" would enable us to include other intellectual fields in the analysis (Princely Mirrors, Chronicles, Siyar al-Muluk, philosophy even).  I find "Islamicate Thought" rather ugly as a construction - and I am not sure many "out there" would know what we mean by it (a few "insiders" might also be unclear).  Istvan disagrees I think - but I have noticed the term being used with increasing frequency - not for the first time, I may be left stranded as the debate moves on.  Still, as an academic community our task may be to bring technical terms into common currency - success in such an endeavour requires a single understanding of those terms, though: a level of unanimity most of us would, I suspect, resist.  On violence, one idea was thrown out (for discussion, not "jettisoned"): violence is what one's enemies do - one's own "violence" is euphemistically glossed: "justified punishment", "regrettable deterrent", "self-defence", "pre-emptive strike" etc.  The Project's presumptive use of the term "legitimate" (and, naturally, illegitimate) gave rise to similar debate: Professor Bulliet, in the final paper of the conference, argued that the most interesting topics within the Project's purview was illegitimate violence: legitimate violence - by which he meant war and conflict perpetrated by a recognised (though not necessarily "just") government - was not only less interesting (being quite normal for any pre-modern or modern state): it was also, relatively speaking, a rarity in Muslim history.  "Illegitimate" violence is much more interesting: the violence of brigands and rebels, of fractious heretics and the seditious youth - the violence of fitna, a "shock-horror" term in the Muslim sources.  Perhaps it is this "illegitimate" violence, existing without state sanction in Islamic history, which forms the historical precedent (and perhaps licence also) for contemporary "radical" movements.  Suffice it to say, the debate goes to the core of the Project's research questions, and gives us much food for thought - and in my mind, not a little reformulation of our collective output might be required.  Our thinking on these general questions was further enriched with detailed studies of episodic violence in the Seljuk, Mongol, Mamluk, Ottoman, Safavid, Uzbek and Moghul periods.  The diversity of approaches was both heartening (a testemony to the health of the field) and disheartening (bringing this diversity together in a single framework seemed more, rather than less, challenging).  It is with pleasure (and not a little relief) that I can say the conversation does not end here: the Islamic Reformulations project, already underway, will provide more space for discussion.  My personal thanks go to all who attended the conference, and especially to those who assisted in its operation.